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Technological transformations have long been considered as a
prime driver of industrial and organisational change (Barley,
1990; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986).
Firms leverage technological transformations to create new
products, enhance their research and development (R&D)25764785; fax: þ91 22 2572
in (M. Raghavan), kjain@iitb.
Jha).
ian Institute of Management
anagement Bangalore. Productio
3.07.003capability and change their strategic position in the business
environment. Technological transformations have the poten-
tial to alter both the nature of resources and associated
leveraging opportunities. One such example is the wireless
telecommunication system where the naturally occurring
resource of the communication medium termed as electro-
magnetic waves, gets gradually transformed into a “technol-
ogycommons”knownas spectrum.Afirm’s strategyhas tonow
take into consideration the limited availability of spectrum
and its impact on the available technical advantage.
Strategy theory assumes resources to be in plenty and
available to all players. However such assumptions lead to a
strategy that is not alignedwith the reality of limited resources
and the associated impact of technological developments
(Berge & Kranakis, 2011; Hamilton, 1997; Humbert, Jolly, &
Therin, 1997; Jolly, 1997; Matheson & Matheson, 1998;
Roussel, Saad, & Erickson, 1991; Stewart, 1992). This line of
thinking directly leads us to the resource management equa-
tion of commons and anticommons.
Commons and anticommons are useful constructs to un-
derstand the impact of appropriation approach by multiplen and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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impact of such appropriation is felt on the resource through
the creation of tragedies e tragedy of commons caused due
to overuse of resources (Hardin, 1968) and tragedy of anti-
commons due to underuse of resources (Heller, 2008).
Identification and managing such tragedies is essential
to avoid problems of appropriation misalignment and for
better resource utilisation and management. The aim of
this paper is to attempt and reposition intellectual property
(IP) from its current role as an enabler of static equity
(monopolistic power to the innovator) to being an enabler
of dynamic efficiency (knowledge available to the public to
help further research). This is possible only when we
identify new interfaces between a firm’s closely interlinked
technology strategy (TS) and IP strategy. While the tech-
nology acquisition and exploitation functions of TS are
directly related to IP creation and its management
respectively, technology management literature provides
the overall guidelines for the firm’s IP strategy design.
The objective of this work is to show that an effective TS
has to manage the access e availability imbalance in the
commons and create value for firms through efficient re-
source utilisation. We need to evolve an approach that can
help firms maintain and leverage both the commons and the
private characteristics of their technological resource
units. An interface framework derived from the commons,
TS, and patent pool literature to help firms manoeuvre
their internal dynamics and align their TS and IP strategy
with the resource characteristics is proposed.
The paper is organised as follows. We first briefly describe
the various strategy theories and their dynamics with tech-
nology, extending the dominant andmodular design approach
as dominant and modular TS respectively. This is followed by
studying and relating the characteristics of dominant and
modularTStothe tragediesof commonsandanticommons.We
then analyse patent pools as an example of a common pool
resource (CPR) using Ostrom’s CPR design principles. By using
the semicommons theory, we then show a new strategic
benefit of patent pools, apart from their existing economic
benefits. Our arguments to relook patent pools in the wake of
transitions in the TS of a firmareexplored in the context of the
telecommunications and computer industries.Weconcludeby
offering a simple framework and the interfaces for the firm to
incorporate the “nature of good” characteristics into their TS
transitions and IP strategies.Strategy theories and the technologyestrategy
dynamics
The emphasis on technological capabilities and their role in
strategy theories has evolved from being secondary to
becoming a primary functionality. Technology strategy (TS)
has been considered as a technology implementation/
positioning issue (Friar & Horwitch, 1986), as a determinant
of industry structure and competitive advantage for a firm
(Porter, 1985), as a timing and firm capabilities issue
(Freeman, 1976; Maidique & Patch, 1978), and as a tie-in to
the firm’s business strategies (Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 1981;
Little, 1981). Hax and Majluf (1984, 1991) and Hax and No
(1992) operationalised TS through strategic technological
units.However, the implementation approach of TS is not suit-
able for highly complex systems which have very short
technology cycles. In dynamic situations characterised by
faster product obsoleteness and increased product com-
plexity, the emphasis is not on the technologies or products
created but on the capabilities of a firm that generates an
effective TS. Strategic intent (Hamel & Prahalad, 1989) and
core competency theory (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990) best
exemplify the shift to resource based value of a firm (RBV)
(Barney, 1991). D’Aveni (1994) highlighted the role of a firm’s
dynamism to continuously generate technological in-
novations over a time period, while Teece (1986) introduced
and discussed the role of appropriation climate for firms to
profit from technological innovations.
While capabilities and competencies may be cumula-
tively added to the firm (Collis, 1991; Dosi & Teece, 1993;
Grindley, 1991; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Stalk, Evans, &
Shulman, 1992), Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997) proposed
the Dynamic Capabilities (DC) of the firm that includes the
role of complements and related real time environmental
variables. DC act as a set of embedded processes that lead
towards efficiency in firm performance and effective
strategy formulation (Wang & Ahmed, 2007).
These transitions in the strategy theory are not only due to
the technological paradigms per se but also by creation and
removal of functionalities (Abell, 1980). The type and nature
of the interactions between technology and strategy has
been effectively addressed by Itami and Numagami (1992). In
this work, we extend the strategyetechnology interactions
identified by Itami and Numagami (1992) by relating them to
relevant strategy theories and insights in Table 1. A gradual
shift towards dynamic constructs in the strategy theory is
evident as we move closer to DC. Chiesa (2001) approached
this dynamism by equating TS to a trajectory for acquisition
and internalisation of technical resources and knowledge.
In Fig. 1, we show the dynamic interaction between
technology and strategy. Technology represents the start-
ing point of the cycle that enables new competencies in
firms and culminates in new strategies with resources
bearing the major impact of technological change. This is
clearly visible in the case of a public good resource
becoming a “managed” commons, which through further
(over)use is either lost or becomes an unusable patent
thicket (anticommons). An effective TS should aim to
manage such impacts. However, the reality of TS failure
and of having little consequence is shown as the dotted line
in Fig. 1. The dotted line is indicative of the missed op-
portunity to recognise the shifting commons nature of the
resources and create suitable appropriation and value ab-
sorption strategies. A systems approach to TS helps firms
manage such resource-strategy dynamics.Technology strategy as a system
A system adapts according to the context while seeking
better “value” (Baldwin and Clark. 2000; Van de Ven, Poole,
& Scott, 1995). A system’s evolution is dependent on two
aspects namely ‘inertia’ and ‘tightness’ of the inter-
connected components, both of which lead to compromises
and non-optimal fit (Kauffman, 1993, 1995). A system can
comprisemultiple subsystems interacting through functional
Table 1 The relationship between technology and strategy (adapted from Itami and Numagami (1992)).
Relationship Analysis Relevant theory (Proponent) Insights
Current strategye
Current technology
Capitalises on technology;
static matching
Positioning approach
(implementation
of technology)
(Porter, 1985)
Context-based (internal
to the firm and
external environment).
Industry is assumed to be
homogenous.
Current strategye
Future technology
Inter-related. Emphasis on
the potential of future technology.
Resource Based View
(RBV) theory.
(Prahalad & Hamel, 1990)
Core-competency approach
to acquire technological skills.
A process-based perspective
towards strategy. Firms are
heterogeneous.
Current technologye
Future strategy
Technology drives strategy
making. Competency becomes
the starting point.
Engaging the dynamic
capabilities theory.
(Teece et al., 1997)
Cognitive effect. Relates to
a set of embedded process.
Emphasis on the environment
and competencies of a firm.
Future strategye
Future technology
Foresight analysis coupled with
technology timing. Technology’s
impact on resources is the feedback.
Dynamic feedback by
integrating commons
and dominant/modular
design strategies.
A systems approach.
Emphasis on the impacts of
technology strategy followed.
The dynamism in technologye
strategy is extended to its
environment, especially
appropriation structures.
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crucial role in evolving the end system (Schilling, 2000). We
extend the systems perspective of product development to
the design of dominant and modular TS.
Dominant technology strategy
A dominant design is one that establishes dominance among
a class of products (Abernathy, 1978; Anderson & Tushman,
1990; Sahal, 1981) or is widely adopted, leading to
competitive change (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978). Domi-
nance can also be in the form of percentage of new product
sales/process installations of a single configuration
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990) or a core design concept
incorporated in major functional components that are part
of the product architecture (Henderson & Clark, 1990).
These definitions indicate that the emergence of dominant
design is a post-facto process and is linked to the shifting
industry structures (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Klepper,
1996; Langlois & Robertson, 1992).
We term the TS that drives and guides the firm’s survival
during periods of technological discontinuities using a
dominant design approach as dominant technology strat-
egy. Traditionally, dominant TS uses switching costs for a
controlled technology push and development of niche ap-
plications as a reward for market pull based technology tie-Figure 1 TechnologyeStrategy relationship.ins. The systemic relationship between technological cause
(dominant strategy) and its consequence (dominant design)
slows the pace of product obsolescence.
Modular technology strategy
Modularity has been defined as the flexibility in the existing
technology architecture to support use of new technolog-
ical components (Henderson & Clark, 1990) or the presence
of complementing firms as per specialisation with in-
terfaces that later integrate to create a single larger sys-
tem (Langlois, 2000). Modularity facilitates easy upgrade of
technology for both customers and producers (Garud &
Kumaraswamy, 1995), increases user value by reducing
switching and product cost, and lowers the producer’s
margin. Its major advantage and drawback is in managing
the exponential number of feasible configurations.
Modularity ismeasured in terms of detachability (tightness
of the coupling) from the existing system and re-
configurability (degree of mix in the design) with minimal
loss of functionality over its life cycle (Langlois, 1992;
Sanchez, 1995; Schilling, 2000). Loosely coupled architec-
tures have positive externalities and utilise the network ef-
fect to overcome the drawbacks of modularity (Garud &
Kumaraswamy, 1995; Katz & Shapiro, 1986a, 1986b;
Schilling, 2000). We term the TS that drives a firm to use
modular design approach as modular technology strategy
(modular TS).
Balancing technology strategies and commons
Value creation through economies of scale drives dominant TS
while economies of scope drives modular TS. Traditional
measures such as production time and first mover advantage
that drive dominant TS get replaced by complementary and
technology platforms, licensing, and standards inmodular TS.
216 M. Raghavan et al.Notwithstanding the inherent heterogeneity in a firm’s ca-
pabilities and user needs, dominant TS leads to proprietary
and user lock-in (Schilling, 2000). This necessitates a modular
TS that optimally incorporates multiple players and their re-
quirements. Modular TS is a disruptive approach that com-
bines a multitude of complementary players to create a
homogeneous system. It also blurs the boundary between
scope and scale by focussing on the needs of both the indi-
vidual and strategic networkof complements. ThemodularTS
approach creates a reinforcing feedback among technology
creators and users which finally results in a dominant design
(Arthur, 1989).
In essence, the relationship between dominant and mo-
dular design is linked to the TS trajectory followed. We term
a “smart dominant” TS as one that ensures overall control on
the architecture and allows modular access within the final
dominant system created. Standards are the best example of
such a smart dominant system. They are immensely benefi-
cial to both the system and component developers as they
are not controlled by a single entity. Standards lean towards
the path of smart dominant system by making the compo-
nents and subsystems locally dominant. Standardisation is an
example of induced synergy where the component func-
tionalities are continuously tuned by breaking down and
reassembling (Baldwin & Clark, 1997). Complex systems
(e.g. telecommunications) have been argued to have syn-
ergistic systems as their core design (Sanchez & Mahoney,
1996; Simon, 1962). Thus, we posit an improvement in
functionality without the loss of reconfigurability as the key
expected outcome of modular TS.
The two types of TS have an impact on resource uti-
lisation. A dominant TS leads to single control and excess
use of the limited resource while a modular TS leads to
multiple players trying to extract their returns from the
limited set of resources. These two characteristics relate
closely with the orthogonal theory of commons. Commons
refers to publicly available resources that are governed for
their access and availability. Excess use of a resource leads
to its degradation in terms of its availability, leading to a
state termed as the tragedy of commons. Responses in the
form of appropriation driven control over resources in turn
lead to tragedy of anticommons. These tragedies are arti-
ficially created and have a close alignment with the char-
acteristics of the TS followed: a dominant TS connects with
the tragedy of commons, while a modular TS shares char-
acteristics with the tragedy of anticommons.Harmonising technology strategy and nature of
goods
The detailed literature review by Somaya (2012) on patent
strategy and management supports our endeavour to
redraw the firm’s technology and IP strategy formationFigure 2 Typetowards better value appropriation. Combining this with a
series of queries raised by Berge and Kranakis (2011) in
relation to “technology commons”, we now analyse aligning
technology and IP strategies based on the dynamics of
resource characteristics. This requires us to engage with
the tragedies of commons and anticommons. We need to
first understand the tragedies as being traditional in-
dicators of IP strategy disparities or as an outcome of the
nonalignment between transitions in the nature of good
that a firm develops and its TS. Through a multidisciplinary
approach combining socio-economics, IP and TS theories,
we identify the latent interfaces between the orthogonal
TS and commons theory. A contemporary role for patent
pools as semicommons is proposed with semicommons
shown to strategically balance both the tragedies and help
firms evolve their technology and IP strategies.
Nature of good and creation of technology
commons
Goods can be classified as either public or private on the basis
of two fundamental attributes e accessibility (measured
through excludability, consent to use) and availability
(measured through rivalry, price) (Holocombe, 1997; Kaul,
Grunberg, & Stern, 1999; Stiglitz, 1995). A good is “public”
if it is non-excludable and non-rivalrous while “private” at
the other extreme (rivalrous and excludable). In other
words, a good that is inexhaustible and infinitely divisible is a
pure public good while the opposite is a private good. An
example of a public good is the environment while that of a
private good is personal transportation.
The“natureof good” spectrumextends acrosspurepublic,
global public, impure public, club, commons and finally pri-
vate domains (Kaul, Conceicao, Goulven, & Mendoza, 2003;
Stiglitz, 2006). As we move forward, the duality in the na-
ture of the good is remarkably visible. Property literature
subtly differentiates public good and commons through the
presence of a governing mechanism that manages the distri-
bution of the benefits derived (Fennell, 2010). The dynamism
that permeates technology is visible through the transitions in
the nature of the goods as presented in Fig. 2. For example,
technological requirements (health, climate) range from
public to club while the technology created (pharmaceuti-
cals, energy) range from commons to private nature of good.
Commons have different ownership characteristics,
namely the resource system and the resource unit. The
creation of commons requires an externality to occur. The
independent and rational approach of humans towards
resource utilisation is presumed to create a commons from
the public nature of the good (Fennell, 2010). Technolog-
ical change is another externality that initiates the creation
of commons as illustrated in Fig. 3.
“Technology” commons is a specific term given to com-
mons created through technological systems (Berge &s of goods.
Nature of 
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Figure 3 Creation of the technology commons.
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interconnected subsystems known as resource units as
depicted in Fig. 4. The number of resource units and their
interconnectedness depend on the complexity of the
technology. Externalities, especially complementarities,
ensure that resource units combine to form the resource
system. Technological evolution is shown as a self-loop at
both the resource unit and system level in Fig. 4. Inter-
estingly, this structure of technology commons closely re-
sembles product architecture characteristics, a link that is
not addressed in existing strategy and commons literature.
Characteristics of technology commons
On the face of it, technology commons do not reveal any
tensions. We can relate the resource system as public and
resource units as private goods. The contention occurs when
the resource units combine to forge a resource system. This
creates a duality that ought to be balanced through exter-
nalities. Externalities are positive in terms of rights that the
resource units avail andnegative in the formof costs incurred
to create and utilise the resource system, as shown in Fig. 5.
An imbalance between these two externalities directly
results in the tragedy of commons. This is visible as a
mismatch in the interaction between the resource units and
resource system, in other words, the appropriation needs of
the unit owners and system developers. This mismatch is
however not known to the end user and the dichotomyResource
Unit 1
Resource
Unit 2
Resource
Unit n
Resource
system
External
ities
created
Technology commons
Figure 4 Components of technology commons.leads to situations of over exploitation of the resource
system known as the tragedy of commons (Cheung, 1970;
Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968).
Tragedy of commons and its resolution
The tragedy of commons exposes the strategic collective
action problem of balancing the interests of the firm, the
sector and society. Resolving the tragedy of commons re-
quires alignment between appropriation (designed through
Intellectual Property Management Systems, IPMS), provi-
sioning of resource units (echoing the innovation manage-
ment processes) and local conditions (related to technology
development and technology strategy process) of the firm
(Jain, Raghavan, & Jha, 2009).
Current solutions toover exploitation are focussedonly on
the production of commons and can be classified into four
dimensions namely state control, subsidies, cooperative
models, and property rights approach (Fig. 6). State control
through advanced property rights has been a preferredmode
for managing commons. Commons is termed as a common
pool resource (CPR) in a system bound by property rules and
in its absence, becomes “open access”. In the case of a
complex technology like telecommunications, “property”
indirectly manages the commons exploitation whereas in a
discrete technology like pharmaceuticals, “property” be-
comes the direct driver of business models. An over-
emphasis on “property” driven structures leads to under-
provisioning of the resource units and system.Figure 6 Approaching the tragedy of commons.
Nature of 
Availability / 
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Independent Technology
Pricing 
Issues
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able subsidies and rewards for generation of resource units,
enabling co-operative approaches amongst the comple-
menting resource unit owners and a higher role for the
state in the creation process or by granting exclusive ben-
efits to the private resource unit creators (Jha, Mukundan,
& Jain, 2010). However each of the four approaches has its
limitations.
We need to first recognise the visible ownership duality
and the technological structure of resource units and sys-
tems leading to appropriation misalignment and man-
agement problems. The right strategic approach towards
managing the tragedy of commons and anticommons should
balance the core issue of resource unit-resource system
ownership duality. We need to solve the issue of inducing
the creation of resource units, which later combine to
create a resource system. For example, in the field of
telecommunication, we should identify how firms can be
encouraged to develop next generation technologies that
make wireless and information and communication tech-
nologies (ICT) accessible and available.
Tragedy of anticommons
The existing approaches attempting to overcome the trag-
edy of commons have been uni-dimensional e they align
the economic incentives for creation of the resource units.
However, these approaches are unable to determine the
right valuation e either as a subsidy/price/license fee on
the pricing aspect (availability) or on the intended usage
(accessibility). In practice, an over-emphasis on “property”
systems leads to a highly granular resource unit ownership.
This leads to further technological specialisations, raises
transaction and coordination costs among multiple parties
and impedes the formation of a resource system from
amongst various resource units (Buchanan & Yoon, 2000;
Heller, 1998; Merges, 1996; Schulz, Parisi, & Depoorter,
2002). The transaction cost theory offers an economic
model to address the thinly sliced anticommons (Coase,
1937, 1960; Demsetz, 1966, 1967). However, it does not
acknowledge the issues of accessibility and effective con-
sent to interact, both of which require different collabo-
rative strategies. The tragedy of anticommons is shown in
Fig. 7.
The over-dependence on market correction leads to
increased information, transaction and measurement costs,
limited suppliers, and few capable users. This raises the
overall cost of the resource system and impacts both the
rivalrousness and excludability nature of resources. This isTragedy of
commons
Incentives 
alignment & 
management
Tragedy of
Anticommons
Consent of
holder
Price for 
holder
Consent 
issues
Pricing
issues
Figure 7 Formation of tragedy of anticommons.especially true in the case of complex technologies where it
is essential for all the resource units to be part of the
resource system. The tragedy of anticommons suggests the
need for an even distribution of resource units, creation of
platform solutions and generation of substitutable resource
units outside of the appropriation system.
Technology strategy and the tragedies faced
Technological changes have causal impact on both the mar-
ket structure and firms (Murmann & Frenken, 2006). Tech-
nological changes promote the novel use of resources
coupled with a gradual loss of their fundamental character-
istics. We however require continued technological inter-
ferences for two apposite reasons: meet consumer demands
and to continually challenge the technological paradigms.
However, the causal impact of change on the resource
structure and on TS has not been adequately analysed. In
such situations, aligning the firm’s TS with resource charac-
teristics is vital to acknowledge the user (community) needs.
The resource units determine whether the developed
technology commons is complex or discrete. A complex
technology commons controls the excludability while a
discrete commons manages the rivalrousness of the “good”
(Fig. 8). The multiple levels of spillovers generated from
the resource units need to be internalised in order to create
relevant social and system level benefits. This is equivalent
to a temporal efficiency trade-off between current and
evolving technologies for the firm.
Anticommons caused by fragmented ownership can be
equated to the heterogeneity of technological components
and related firms. Resource units can be equated with the
specialised firms with the option to combine and form
substitutable resource systems. From a strategy perspec-
tive, resource units indicate firm-level developments while
a resource system mirrors industrial development. The
balance of power between resource units and the resource
system determines technology governance. Currently, the
governance of anticommons through appropriation strate-
gies is a post-facto activity. For example, compulsory
licensing designed to take care of anticommons is inher-
ently unstable due to the skewed emphasis on resourcethe good rational behaviour commons
Accessibilty / 
Excludability
Consent
issues Complex Discrete
Technology strategy
interface
Figure 8 Association between commons and the nature of
goods.
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ability characteristic of the resource unit. This widens the
existing dichotomy between the resource unit and system.
A valuable strategy would be to identify and create a
network of complementary technology commons providers.
A firm wanting to be a part of the dynamic technology
commons should have complementary resource units that
can create a platform or multi-use capability and yield
distributed benefits (Table 1). In the telecommunication
industry, service providers form the dominant resource
system and technology firms act as the modular resource
units. These reasons highlight the importance of incorpo-
rating the impact of commons in the TS design of a firm. We
thus present our first proposition that the creation of
tragedy of commons and anticommons is strongly influ-
enced by a firm’s TS.
Balancing the tragedies and the way forward
We need to align technological developments on both
accessibility and availability perspectives in order to bal-
ance the two tragedies. We take the standards driven in-
dustry and analyse patent pools as an example. Pooling
provides the best balance between a dominant design and
system. A pool shares risks, expands the platform oppor-
tunities, and lowers the cost for its members (Chen & Liu,
2005) e all characteristics of modularity incorporated into
the dominant system.
Semicommons and its role in TS alignment
Property has a mix of public, commons, and private charac-
teristics (Bertacchini, De Mot, & Depoorter, 2008; Fennell,
2011; Smith, 2000, 2004, 2005). Acknowledging the com-
mons feature of the individual resource units helps create a
resource system of notable value, especially in the case of
complex technologies (Panzar & Willig, 1981). Over-emphasis
on a single characteristic of a property tends to result in either
of the tragedies. Property literature while discussing the
tragedies of commons and anticommons identifies the pres-
ence of an intermediate structure termed as semicommons.
We first relate patent pools to common pool resources
and later extend them by proposing a contemporary role for
patent pools as semicommons. The semicommons approach
provides a strategic balance between the two tragedies
and helps firms evolve next generation technology and IP
strategy. Semicommons is an ownership structure where
assets are used in common but participants retain the pri-
vate property rights in those same assets for specific ad-
vantages that affect their mean return (Fennell, 2011;
Smith, 2000, 2005).
It is reasonable for the characteristics of certain goods to
be prominent at certain time periods (Fennell, 2011; Smith,
2000, 2004). This suggests that a better approach to ana-
lysing property characteristics is through its temporal dimen-
sion. A “good” which is private in time t0 could be public
(commons) in t1 (Damsgaard, Parikh, & Rao, 2006; Fennell,
2011; Smith, 2000, 2004, 2005). Managing the transitions be-
tween t0 and t1, we can deal with and overcome the identified
tragedies. Examples include private assets in joint ventures
(Smith, 2004), information goods (Heverly, 2003; Smith, 2007)and telecommunication wireless spectrum access regulation
(Damsgaard et al., 2006; Smith, 2005). The concept of semi-
commons as in the example of grazing fields has been widely
studied in the traditional property literature.
Semicommons solves both the tragedies and is ideal for
homogenous, complex systems (having multiple owners).
Higher firm specialisation leads to individual ownership of
resource units with each being a vital part of the final re-
source system. Semicommons are also strategically gamed
by firms either by increasing one’s share of the commons or
by transferring the private cost onto other participants. In
both the cases, internalisation is zero, which leads to the
tragedies of commons (social cost) and anticommons (pri-
vate costs) respectively (Bertacchini et al., 2008; Smith,
2004).
Operating at multiple levels and across time periods en-
ables semicommons to provide higher efficiency than a pure
commons or a private good (Smith, 2000). Depending on the
temporal state, semicommons function as defensive cost
mechanisms that balance the excessive use of the commons
or as full-scale internalisation that extend the private ben-
efits of the resource unit. This suggests that institutional
structures are needed to moderate such strategic behaviour
in a semicommons setting (Bertacchini et al., 2008; Fennell,
2011; Heverly, 2003; Smith, 2000, 2005, 2004).
Semicommons are primarily managed via the anti-
commons route, benefiting from multiple uses of the re-
source at the same time (Bertacchini et al., 2008; Fennell,
2011; Smith, 2005). Increasing social costs inversely reflect
on the formation of the resource system which then drives
the private cost of resource unit creation. In a pure anti-
commons structure, the absence of interpreting resources
for their temporal ability is a cause of social cost (non-for-
mation of the resource system).
The traditional property approach to semicommons is
through the “scattering field method” wherein the ratio of
common to individual holdings is evenly distributed across the
entire site (Smith, 2000). This way, every unit holder stands a
fair chance to access the relevant inputs. In the technology
space, a patent pool can be equated to the scattering field
method. A patent pool integrates the statutory and indepen-
dent ownership of resource units towards the formation of a
technology commons (resource system). The ambiguity in
patent scope ensures that semicommons approach provides a
crucial governance structure for a patent pool.
We nowask the following questions: Can patent pools offer
a new benefit by acting as semicommons and balance the
tragedies? Howdowe incorporate such developments into the
design of suitable TS for a firm? We answer these questions by
first identifying patent pool as a CPR; and then extend it to
include the characteristics of semicommons. This lends itself
to a contemporary and strategic role for patent pools.
Patent pools and commons design
Patent pools have been traditionally used by inventor(s) to
maintain their hold over a particular technological innovation.
Initiated as a controlling cartel (such as in the case of sewing
machines), patent pools have expanded to manage the
transaction costs (as in the case of networking, semi-
conductors, and telecommunications) and finally in access-
driven requirements (medicine and ecology). The current
220 M. Raghavan et al.patent pools have evolved from the earlier patent thickets
based structure (Merges, 2001; Shapiro, 2001). Expanding
patent subject matter and the role of Trade Related Intellec-
tual Property Rights (TRIPS) has led to a sharp increase in
patent protection, which in turn has raised the anticommons
effect. This escalates into an overlap of claims and rights
across patents, finally ending with litigation driven IP control,
a far cry from the original purpose of technology and IP
strategy. The biotechnology sector is a classic example of this
anticommons effect (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998).
Traditional patent pool design literature has focused
almost exclusively, on the network effect and transaction
cost benefits (Gilbert, 2004; Kato, 2004; Katz & Shapiro,
1986a, 1986b; Lerner & Tirole, 2004; Merges, 1996). Pooling
also offers easy control over the dominant technical archi-
tecture provided the pool’s economic design maintains both
co-operative and competitive effects. Complex technologies
like semiconductor design, digital memories, optical devices,
bluetooth, and wireless communications have utilised patent
pools with their associated transaction cost benefits in an
attempt to overcome the tragedy of anticommons.
On the collective goods front, Ostrom (1990) describes
eight principles for designing a common pool resource
(CPR). Traditionally, these design principles have been
applied to homogenous, natural community resources. We
extend the CPR design principles to the heterogeneous,
intellectual assets. Patent pool is an example of inter-firmTable 2 Linking patent pools to commons design principles.
S. No Ostrom’s commons principle Patent poo
1. Resource users or appropriators
should have clearly
defined boundaries.
All resourc
Boundaries
2. Rules of appropriation should be
tuned to local conditions.
The licens
complexity
if any, and
3. Rules may be modified by
those affected.
Patent hol
with the p
can also b
However,
breakdown
and techni
4. Those monitoring appropriators’
behaviour should either be
appropriators themselves or
accountable to them.
The paten
of a stand
to a pool c
5. Sanctions may be imposed
on rule breakers.
Firms lack
technologi
invalidate
6. Appropriators should have
access to cheap
conflict-resolution
mechanisms.
In-built re
independe
also specifi
7. External bodies should have the
right to organise.
Patent poo
the patent
8. Multiple levels of governance
are essential.
Patent hol
manager c
Each is a s
being themodularity and resolves the anticommons tragedy by
incorporating a loose coupling of related heterogeneous
core patents. Due to the complementary nature of the
patents submitted to the pool, the patent pool can be
termed a homogenous resource system. In strategy terms,
we can now apply Ostrom’s CPR design to the/new set of
heterogeneous resource units. This strengthens our first
proposition of using TS to overcome the tragedies of com-
mons. Ostrom’s design principles of commons and their
relationship to patent pool design are shown in Table 2.
The property system provides a bundle of five inter-
connected and mutually inclusive legal rights e Access,
Withdrawal, Management, Exclusion, and Alienation for the
purposes of exclusion, ownership and licensing (Schlager &
Ostrom, 1992). Bundling the five legal rights in a function-
ally meaningful combination makes the patent pool an
example of a homogenous institutional design. By limiting
the externality to the developers (internal), the patent
pool design facilitates incorporation of complementary
patents into the pool. This can be likened to enhancing the
commons benefit by absorbing the positive externality
which occurs during technological development (Fennell,
2011; Smith, 2005; Wormbs, 2011).
This linking of CPRs and patent pool serves as a unique
strategic lens to examine the role of patent pools, which is
missing across existing strategy, commons and IP literature.
We are now in a position to present our second proposition:l alignment
e units are independently owned.
are defined by the patent claims.
ing is tailored to specific needsdthe
of the technology, role of standards,
competition and licensing style.
ders can join or quit a pool in discussion
ool manager. The licensing formulae
e modified to suit the growth of the technology.
removing a patent from the pool can lead to the
of the pool itself, from both the economic
cal perspective.
t pool has an administrative manager in the case
ards-based patent pool or the primary contributor
an act as the manager of the pool.
ing essential patents or having substitutable
es can be removed from the pool. The option to
a patent in its lifetime is another important sanction threat.
solution mechanisms are present in the form of an
nt pool manager. For legal support, the government
es economic guidelines for the formation of a patent pool.
l managers need not be exclusively affiliated to
owners.
der > standards > patent pool participants > patent pool
onstitute the levels of governance present in a patent pool.
ubset of the other, with the patent pool manager
final governing authority.
Integrating commons with the technology and IP strategy of a firm 221Patent pools as a semicommons construct helps firms to
balance the tragedies of commons (access) and anti-
commons (availability) and maximise their returns/
outcomes.
Patent pool as semicommons
A patent pool has both private (individual ownership) and
commons characteristics (group representing all relevant
patents). By associating with standards, patent pools
enable easier access to essential patents (resource units)
required to create the final product (resource system). The
patent pool thus functions as a vital interface between the
technology and IP strategy of a firm. The IP strategy is ex-
pected to balance the different ownership characteristics
of a resource system and resource unit while the technol-
ogy strategy assists in the formation of resource system and
units.
Patent pool participants follow a common licensing and
governance setup. An added benefit of a pool is the in-
crease in the bargaining power due to a single-point access
for all the relevant patents. The success of a patent pool
hinges on its licensing mechanism, which includes options
based on portfolio contribution, total sales, revenue
generated, quality of patent contribution to the pool or
essentiality to the standards. In order to prevent anti
competitive practises, patent pools in USA are to be first
approved by the American Department of Justice (DoJ,
Essentiality of patent pools, 2009). This is the first step
towards satisfying the private and common components as
identified and listed by the authors in Table 3. The validity
period of a patent (resource unit) provides the temporal
effect of semicommons in a patent pool.Table 3 Patent pools and semicommons.
Patent pool requirements Semicommons
relationship
Observa
Essential patents related
to the standard.
Commons nature This en
(includi
of a pa
The po
avoids
Howeve
imbalan
Non-exclusive licenses
for exploring
alternative technologies.
Private nature The no
approa
particu
license
patents
This dif
Rights to license patents
separately
outside the pool.
Private nature The pa
not rela
provide
Grant back of non-exclusive
licenses to the pool for
enhancements to
essential patents.
Commons/
private nature.
This gra
the late
and sig
relevan
essenti
the pooThe commons component of the patent pool depends on
the essentiality of a patent while the licensing structure
determines its private component. Essentiality, in turn, is
linked to the specific standards clause attached to the
patent claims, while the patent scope determines the
licensing structure. It also enables the patent owner to
identify the economies of scope that are outside of the
patent pool boundary. Pools that allow independent
licensing for non-competing applications maintain the pri-
vate nature of the patent (resource unit) that forms a part
of the pool (resource system). Similarly some pools do not
require the grant back of patent enhancements (resource
unit’s evolution), enabling firms to effectively use tech-
nology evolution to manage their strategic moves.
Fig. 9 integrates all the earlier figures to provide the
complete flow and the identified interfaces through which
the firm’s IP and technology strategy can manage the
tragedies of commons and anticommons. We identify three
interfaces for the technology strategy and two interfaces
for IP strategy of a firm to take care of the resource char-
acteristics and balance the tragedies that arise.Exploring telecommunication systems
In applying the propositions, let us first consider the evolu-
tion of wireless telecommunications. The core resource for
wireless communications is the availability of spectrum of
electromagnetic waves. Technological evolution has helped
achieve wider coverage, mobility, and bandwidth over
segmented spectrum, known as frequency bands. However,
resources have a practical limit; the managed commons of
spectrumwhen overused leads to the tragedy of commons intions
sures that all the technically essential patents
ng complements) are available for the deployment
rticular technology to any user at reasonable licensing fees.
ol internalises in three ways: avoids royalty stacking,
patent blocking and reduces the transaction cost.
r, removal of even one essential patent can potentially
ce the pool.
n-exclusive license mode allows the pool to
ch multiple players, without binding the licensee to a
lar technology. This enables the
e to explore substitute technologies outside of essential
and is an example of reducing anti-competitive acts.
fers from cross licensing.
tent holder can look for new applications of the patent,
ted to the standard. Helps when having broad claims and
s economies of scope.
nt back mechanism if available helps the pool to use
st technological researchdsupports both incremental
nificant innovations
t to the technology. It reduces the risk of excluding a future
al patent from the pool. Absence of this mechanism makes
l of a private nature.
Figure 9 Integrated model to manage commons through technology and IP strategy interface.
222 M. Raghavan et al.terms of interference, excess licenses, and poor use of
spectrum. The final telecom system evolves into a dominant
system by utilising the modular interfaces created through
the standards. The modular interfaces enable firms to
specialise and develop the relevant technologies. Technol-
ogy components like voice processors, signal processors,
radio frequency systems, user interfaces, and power systems
are examples of technological resource units while the final
telecommunication system (e.g. an exchange) represents
the resource system.
Along with their independent enhancements, these
technical resource units have to necessarily interact to
create the next generation telecom exchange system.
Thus, we see a close association between the resource
units and the resource system. The technological resource
units are individually created by specialised firms while
the telecommunication system is an integrated product of
a service provider or a system developer.
Patents and patent pools have continuously impacted the
growth of next generation telecommunication systems. The
second generation (1970e1990) of wireless communications
standard (GSM) witnessed the licensing of only 100 patents.
Motorola in GSM technology and Qualcomm in CDMA tech-
nology utilised the patent strategy route to leverage their
resource units and control the wireless communication
system technology commons. The CDMA technology for both
the resource unit and system was primarily controlled by a
single firm, suggesting a dominant strategy towards its
growth. However, in the third generation (1995 onwards) of
GSM wireless communication, nearly 1000 patents were
submitted as essential for the relevant standards to be
implemented. This led to the creation of a patent pool from
the third generation of mobile telecommunications on-
wards. This morphed into a technology platform, suggesting
a modular strategy approach for the fourth generation
known as International Mobile Telecommunications e
Advanced (IMT-Advanced).We see both the patent pool and standards playing
unique roles in the above situations. Both the dominant
and modular strategies have been unknowingly imple-
mented through a semicommons structure of patent pools
to overcome the tragedies and comedies of commons.
Thus standards, a dominant systems strategy approach,
through patent pools provide the relevant governance
structure that helps the resource systems overcome the
tragedies.
Technology, IP strategy and the commons
The strategic management of patents has so far been limited
to incorporating the strength of the IP system. It still con-
tinues to have the lacuna of incorporating the role of nature
of goods in patent strategy andmanagement. A tight bonding
between a firm’s technology and IP strategy signifies the
balance between private and social growth. The semi-
commons theory serves as a distinctive strategic platform to
balance the tragedies of commons and anticommons.
Through our earlier two propositions, patent pools have been
identified as the interface that integrates TS, patent and
commons theory. We now propose a simple framework that
helps firms identify transitions in their TS that aligns with the
changing nature of the “technology good” e from public to
private and vice-versa. This helps the firm to formulate
effective and practical TS.
Technology strategy transitions and the shift in
“nature of good”
Traditional TS is primarily based on the two actions of tech-
nology acquisition and exploitation (Chiesa, 2001; Ford,
1988; Hax & Majluf, 1984; Hax & No, 1992; Schilling, 2000).
Various processes affect the transition of public goods
through the public / commons / private route. This
Late in technology cycle
joint ventures
under public – private
reduction in
internal R&D
Figure 10 Managing transitions from public to private through technology strategy.
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The impact of technological specialisation on the “public
good” is shown in Fig. 10 by thehorizontal arrows culminating
in tragedy of anticommons. Transition in the reverse direc-
tion: private / commons / public too occurs. Stand-
ardisation of private technological developments, open
source software consolidation via patent donation is a typical
example of this reverse shift. These shifts suggest that firms
should time their TS transition along with the changing ”na-
ture of good”.
Technology acquisition is prompted by reduction in in-
ternal R&D, urgency in developing a complex system,
maturing of technologies necessitating large scale
licensing, or monolithic public ventures driving technology
growth. Thus, a greater focus on acquisition in a firm’s TS is
made visible by the increasing “licensing-in” process of a
firm and is an indicator of transition in the “nature of
good”. Dominant TS identified as a driver of tragedy of
commons can be related to the technology acquisition
process of a firm. The public to private transition (Fig. 10)
can be tied with the technology acquisition mode of a TS.
Larger the acquisitions, greater the commons tragedy while
patent pools help firms to utilise licensing mechanisms
rather than acquisition of relevant technologies.
The other major component of TS, technology exploi-
tation, occurs in heavily segmented industries where the
resource units have been identified as essential, comple-
ment each other, and there is a need to move from a de-Semi co
Commons
Dominant 
design
Dominant
design
Gradual expi
of IP rights
Figure 11 Managing transitions from privatfacto to a de-jure standardised solution. Other factors
leading to technology exploitation include development
of early “breakthrough” technologies, licensing based
business models as in fabless semiconductors or IP based
R&D firms. Technology exploitation can be identified by a
greater focus towards “licensing out” by firms (illustrated
in Fig. 11). The private-to-public transitions are chan-
nelled through a patent pool structure before they
completely go out of protection. This requires a different
TS to be implemented by the firm. A standards driven
system is an example of the reverse transition from pri-
vate to public. Patent pools through their complements
balance the private anticommons tragedy through their
licensing mechanism and ensure the relevant technolo-
gies are better exploited. With the gradual expiry of the
patent, technology comes into the commons/open
domain, making the resource system highly available
(Wormbs, 2011).
The challenge for a patent pool is to maintain essential
and complementing patents (resource units) ensuring high
quality. Patent pool via the semicommons structure mod-
erates the changes in the “nature of good” in both the types
of transitions as it includes private (individual ownership)
and public characteristics (group representing all relevant
patents). The role of an IP strategy is to balance these two
sets of attributes while in the process of value seeking
and TS assists in its formation through resource units and
systems.mmons – patent pool 
Essential technology
segmented industry
urgency to exploit
early in technology life cycle
Modular
tech strategy
Modular
tech strategy
Tragedy of 
anti commons - 
private
Technology
exploitationry 
License out
e to public through technology strategy.
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perspective reiterates the view of Wormbs (2011) that tech-
nology clearly affects appropriation and institutions present.
Through individual ownership, patents internalise the com-
mons tragedy, while the pool reflects the positive external-
isation that occurs. The patent pool creates a bundle of
modular and interlinked rights, with specific attributes that
are useful and relevant at specific instances. Patent pools are
thus a useful mechanism to incentivise production of all na-
ture of goods because they can serve as an effective interface
between the technology, IP, and commons strategy of a firme
it balances both the technology acquisition and technology
exploitation portion of a firm’s TS!Timing the technology strategy transitions e the
case of the computer industry
We now explore how firms in the computer industry handled
their TS transition along with the changing nature of the
technology developed. The computer industry is a classic
example due to the presence of firms having both domi-
nant and modular TS. Examples of organisations with domi-
nant TS include IBM and Microsoft, while examples of
modular TS are the open source Linux and again, IBM!
Interestingly, patent pools have been explored in the anti-
commons to commons transition of the computer industry
and we can now relate it as a semicommons approach in
practice.
Traditional patent based control and technology acqui-
sition have been the strategies followed by firms like IBM,
Microsoft and others in the computer industry e either at
the personal computer (PC) level or at enterprise (main-
frame) level from firms. As computer systems became
dominant, the firms leveraged their patent portfolio to
generate more licensing revenues. “Wintel” is the classic
example of the bundled Intel motherboard and Microsoft
Windows operating system that dominated the computer
industry. The dominant TS led to tragedy of commons with
the PC segment being dominated by Microsoft and main-
frames (enterprise level) by IBM. The policy response to the
tragedy of commons was through the traditional route of IP
e expanding the patentability criteria and providing the
appropriation flexibility to the innovators.
A paradigm shift occurred around late 1990s in terms of
operating system (OS) development through the open
source licensing route. Commonly known as the Linux
operating system, this led to a series of landmark shifts
occurring in both the PC and mainframe industry segments.
With the evolution of the Linux OS, many other application
and related software under the open source route were
successfully developed. Examples include Apache web
server, MySQL and PHP script. IBM is the unique firm that
has shown its presence in both the paradigms. Specifically,
this new paradigm towards open source software develop-
ment impacted both the PC and enterprise segment by
bringing in new software developers and business models in
the computer industry.
However, the modularity of the open source approach
met with the tragedy of anticommons due to the numerous
patents granted. Open source licensing agreement provides
the freedom to share the developed code for people toexplore and enhance. This enhanced the availability of open
source software developed for both the PC and enterprise
segments making it tough for IBM to compete against
numerous other software providers. As a TS response, IBM
had to embrace the open source development in order to
maintain its technology position. IBM was the major domi-
nant firm to make this transition and it redrew its TS to
incorporate the anticommons to commons route while other
dominant firms continued with their existing TS.
With its large collection of patents, IBM waited for the
diffusion of Linux based systems at both the enterprise and
PC industry level and did a landmark TS shift by donating
around 500 of its Linux related patents to the community
for implementation (Patent Commons, 2005). With the
reference to Fig. 11, we can relate the Linux patent
donation strategy of IBM as an example of timing their TS
and IP strategy as per the changing nature of the good
(moving towards open source and commons).
From the IP strategy angle, the continuous public pressure
and acceptance of open source based solutions questioned
the need for software patents. This newly developed ex-
ternal environment necessitated IBM to balance its portfolio
of Linux related patents and synergise with its redrawn TS.
This lead to the creation of Open Invention Network (OIN,
2005) by six other dominant firms e IBM, NEC, Novell, Phi-
lips, Red Hat, and Sony. The motive for OIN was to act as a
defensive patent pool for Linux implementation. Open In-
vention Network formed its set of Linux patent pool by
buying out the various patents or by donation by the core
members. These donated/bought patents were then
licensed to the various firms. Firms were given royalty free
licenses towards using Linux in their products. Thus from an
offensive use of software patent portfolio, IBM transitioned
to be part of a defensive patent pool related to Linux OS
development. This transition in both the TS and IP is a
reflection of the shift in approach from technology acquisi-
tion to technology exploitation.
Such similar transitions in the computer industry are
visible in the JEDEC based memory interface (SRAM, SDRAM,
DRAM, DDRAM3) and the open document standard patents.
The open mobile alliance in wireless communications is
another example where the existing anticommons structure
transitioned through patent pools into a commons based
system. In effect, all these developments include patent
pooling as a defensive strategy against the tragedy of
anticommons.Contributions to theory and practice
By using an interdisciplinary approach, this research helps
comprehend the latent linkages identified between the
strategy, commons, and IP theories. On the strategy theory
front, critical impact of resource utilisation has been re-
contextualised in the light of the firm’s TS. The proposed
model of integrating the commons principle into TS is
rooted in Teece et al., (1997) dynamic capabilities frame-
work (1997) and provides logical support to incorporate
“nature of good” as one of the environmental variables.
Our model goes beyond Porter’s approach to technology as
a competitiveness enhancer and extends Prahalad and
Hamel (1990) core competency principle in relation to TS.
Integrating commons with the technology and IP strategy of a firm 225On the commons theory front, this study has extended
Ostrom’s CPR design rules (1990) for natural resources to
technological developments that are combined into a pat-
ent pool. Semicommons provide us with a platform to
explore and use a mix of property regimes as incentives to
owners (Lueck & Miceli, 2007). We also expand the concept
of semicommons from the legal to strategy theory through
the patent pool construct.
Patent pool converts discrete heterogeneous patent
holders into a homogenous patent portfolio. This widens the
application of semicommons to intellectual resources from
its existing emphasis on natural resources. This expanded
role for patent pool as semicommons, recommends a new
governance functionality, extending Merges’ (2001) and
Smith’s (2007) work. The semicommons approach strategi-
cally strengthens patent pools and leads to positive spillovers
(balancing tragedies of commons and anticommons through
semicommons construct), thus extending Lerner and Tirole’s
(2004) argument for patent pool creation. This research
provides analytical support to the reflections of Kim and
Mahoney (2005) suggesting the need for governance struc-
tures (pool as a CPR) and legal structures (pools as semi-
commons) for efficiency outcomes when incorporating
positive spillovers as in patent pools.
On the practice front, it is very essential for firms to
time their strategy as per the resource conditions present.
Using the TS components and through the example of the
PC industry, we have endeavoured to provide a framework
for firms to time their strategy with the changing “nature of
good”, both for public to private and private to public
transition. The firm’s IPMS now plays a dynamic role
through the patent pool to leverage private resource units
while the innovation management process manages the
resource system in a co-operative mode, thus setting the
environment to incorporate multiple innovation processes
in a firm (Jha et al., 2010).Conclusions
Firms centred on technological assets need to develop
value generation strategies anchored in commons man-
agement. This becomes essential when such advancements
introduce modifications in a resource’s fundamental attri-
butes. This work posits two propositions e one, a firm’s TS
strongly influences the creation of tragedy of commons and
anticommons and two, patent pools as a semicommons
construct helps firms to balance the tragedies of commons
(access) and anticommons (availability) and maximise their
returns.
This leads us to look at the “nature of good” (commons
theory) as the fulcrum through which a firm can create
flexible technology and IP strategy. Interfaces through
which the firm’s technology and IP strategy balance the
dynamics of resource characteristics and enable better
value distribution have been identified.
The temporal feature of the semicommons theory
helps us to relate with the changing nature of goods by
mapping to the private and social benefits of the IP
generated. This leads us to an IP strategy that facilitates
understanding the shift in the use of property rights from
an exclusive, private driven approach to a usabilityoriented approach. Such a dynamic and flexible IP
strategy provides a working solution to issues of applying
semicommons in practice.
Patent pools have been successfully associated with the
principles of CPRs and semicommons by extending the
semicommons theory’s from physical property to intellec-
tual property. Such extensions help firms to proactively
explore the patent’s usage boundaries while seamlessly
monitoring the resource characteristic dynamics. Semi-
commons provides a distinctive strategic platform and
interface for patent pools by stressing on complementary
patents of consistent quality and essentiality (equivalent to
scattering of physical resources).
Through the computer industry as an example, this work
provides an example of how firms can time their technology
strategy transition that are in line with the changing nature
of the technology (from anticommons to commons). Wire-
less telecommunication as an industry was used to map the
identified technology and IP strategy interfaces. The TS
transition framework for firms embracing the reverse path
of anticommons to commons is in sync with the success of
open invention network (the current number of licensees is
w500 with more than 10 dominant firms being part of the
network!). Limited to a theoretical analysis, the proposed
framework requires further empirical support and detailed
case studies to create a validated model. This can include a
detailed structural analysis of various patent pools present
across industries and capturing its impact on the technology
strategy transition in firms.References
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